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This paper applies the theory of relational contracts to make precise the idea that because 
households are engaged in a repeated non-cooperative game, Pareto efficient outcomes can 
be supported by self interest, given the specific pattern of specialisation and exchange which 
exists in the household. The household’s choice of a particular solution from the resulting 
feasible set is found by the maximisation of a household welfare function, a generalisation of 
a suggestion originally made by Samuelson. This nests as special cases the objective 
functions used in currently popular models of households engaged in one-shot cooperative 
games. We take a specific example of such a household welfare function, characterise the 
determinants of the household utility distribution, and then apply the model to examine the 
effects of a move from joint to individual taxation. We show that on standard stylised facts, 
secondary earners are always better off absolutely, and define the conditions under which 
they will also be so relatively. This confirms the conclusions from models which concern 
themselves only with the across-household welfare distribution. 
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 1 Introduction
There is now a large literature that takes seriously the idea that the model of
the household as a single individual is inadequate for many purposes and that
it is necessary to develop multi-person household models.1 This literature is
dominated by models that see the household as playing a one-shot cooperative
game. For example, the Nash bargaining models introduced by Manser and
Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981), and further developed by Ott
(1992), Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and Chen and Woolley (2001), rest on
the assumption that the household members can make binding commitments.
Likewise, the "collective model" of Browning and Chiappori (1998) assumes that
the household maximises a form of utility function that is a weighted sum of
the individual utility functions of its members. This, as Samuelson pointed out
in his 1956 paper, assumes that the household reaches some sort of consensus
that enables the application of the concept of a social welfare function to the
modelling of household decision taking. The maximands in both these types
of models possess the Pareto property, that the household always judges an
increase in utility of any one of its members to be a good thing, other things
being equal. It is then not surprising, even if not inevitable, that the household
resource allocations produced by these models are Pareto e¢ cient.
The Pareto e¢ ciency of household allocations seems to be a reasonable re-
quirement, since it is hard to see why a household would not want to exhaust all
possibilities of costless improvement in the welfare of its members. Although of
course Pareto e¢ ciency would not necessarily follow if the household were mod-
elled as behaving non-cooperatively, often a vague appeal is made to the idea
that the household is in fact engaged in a repeated game, with an implicit ap-
peal to the Folk Theorem providing the basis for the assumption of cooperative
behaviour.
Beginning with Ott (1992), this casual assumption has however been chal-
lenged. She showed that if a household chooses its resource allocation in any
given period by Nash bargaining, but the members could not commit themselves
at one point in time to implement some particular allocation at any future pe-
riod of time, then it is easy to construct a model in which the current allocation
is not Pareto e¢ cient. Lundberg and Pollak (2003) and Apps and Rees (2009b)
present models with similar conclusions.
Descriptively speaking, it seems reasonable to assume that a household is en-
gaged in a repeated game and cannot write exogenously enforceable agreements
to implement cooperative behaviour. On the other hand, there are laws and
social norms that at least to some extent regulate or in￿ uence behaviour within
households, though ultimately, an important role must be played by the self in-
terest of the members in supporting e¢ cient allocations. In our view therefore,
the theory of relational contracts,2 developed initially for labour markets and
agency situations, provides an appropriate set of concepts with which to model
1For a survey see for example Apps and Rees (2009b).
2See for example MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), (1998) and Levin (2003).
2household decision making. In this paper we follow up this idea and apply the
resulting model to a discussion of taxation policy.
2 The Model
2.1 The Stage Game
The household consists of a primary and a secondary earner, labelled respec-
tively i = 1;2: The primary earner divides his time between market work and
leisure, the secondary earner spends in addition time in household production.3
The time constraints are therefore
l1 + z1 ￿ 1; h2 + l2 + z2 ￿ 1 (1)
where l denotes market labour supply, h time spent in household production
and z leisure, the direct consumption of one￿ s own time. Total time available
is normalised to 1. Market wage rates are wi and the household production
function is
y = kh2 k > 0 (2)
with y the total output of the household good. This implies that the opportunity




















This determines the utility possibility set of the household. De￿ne a household
resource allocation as a vector a = (x1;y1;z1;x2;y2;z2): Note that, given (1)
(which will be satis￿ed as equalities) and (2), a value of a implies also time
allocations li and h2: Then, given the individual utility functions ui(xi;yi;zi);
which are strictly concave and increasing, and the feasible set of consumption
vectors








3We do not explicitly model the reasons for this specialisation. Apps (1981) however shows
how it can result from a rational household decision in the face of labour market discrimination
and loss of work-related human capital. For further discussion see Apps and Rees (2009b).
3the household￿ s utility possibility set is
￿ = fu = (u1;u2) 2 R2
+; ui = ui(xi;yi;zi); a 2 ￿g (7)
Given the assumptions on the utility functions this is a compact convex set and
its upper boundary is of course the Pareto e¢ cient set
￿ = fu￿ 2 ￿; u￿
1 = argmaxu1 s:t: u￿
2 2 ￿g (8)
Note that the mapping ! : ￿ 7￿! ￿ has an inverse ￿ : ￿ 7! ￿; giving the
resource allocation required to generate a speci￿c utility pair.
From Abreu (1986) we know that it su¢ ces to consider the utility levels that
would be generated in the worst punishment that can be in￿ icted on a player
who deviates from some agreed allocation. In the present context this would
correspond to the utility that would be achieved if the relationship were ended.
Thus denote by u0
i the utility that would be achieved by i in the next best
feasible household to the one in question, and u0 = (u0
1;u0
2): Then we make the
assumption
A1: u0 2 Int￿
so that there exist (u1;u2) 2 ￿ such that ui > u0
i; i = 1;2: This simply
ensures that household allocations exist that make it individually rational to
remain within the household. Then de￿ne ￿0 = fu 2 ￿; ui ￿ u0
ig ￿ ￿ and ￿0
as the corresponding subset of ￿: We are interested in a household relational
contract (HRC) that supports a household equilibrium resource allocation a￿
yielding a point u￿ = !(a￿) 2 ￿0: We now have to consider what such a contract
could look like.
2.2 Household Relational Contracts
We assume, as in MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), (1998), that all outcomes are
observable but not necessarily contractible. The relationship begins at date ￿;
and we consider any time period t 2 [￿;1):We assume that the primary earner,
1, has a binding commitment to pay some amount of consumption c to the
secondary earner. This can be regarded as a level set by law, custom or social
norm. He also, at the end of the period, makes a discretionary payment4 b; which
is contingent on 2 having adhered to the agreement. Thus the consumptions of
the individuals are
x1 = w1l1 ￿ c ￿ b (9)
x2 = w2l2 + c + b (10)
As well as specifying b; a household relational contract (HRC) speci￿es a feasible
household resource allocation a. Then b and c have also to be feasible in the
sense that given a; and therefore li and h2, they are such that xi ￿ 0; i = 1;2:
4We use the term "payment" rather than "transfer" to emphasise that there is an under-
lying process of exchange, of market for household consumptiom, associated with the pattern
of specialisation within the household.
4Denote the resulting set of (b;c) pairs by ￿(a): Then, a HRC is a triplet (a;b;c);
with a 2 ￿; (b;c) 2 ￿(a):
However, the set of feasible HRC￿ s will be further restricted by incentive
compatibility conditions. Let Uit denote the present value of the utility stream,
and uit the ￿ ow of utility in period t; that i obtains under the given HRC, while
U0
it and u0
it are the corresponding values for the outside options introduced in
the previous section. Then if ￿ 2 (0;1] is the one-period discount factor for both
individuals, we have





and individual rationality constraints are
Uit ￿ U0
it i = 1;2 (13)
Satisfaction of these constraint implies that the partners ￿nd it individually
worthwhile to continue in the relationship.
Now, reneging on the HRC would take the following forms:
1 could refuse to make the payment b; having consumed his share of the
household good y1, in which case he would have the utility
^ u1t = arg max
x1tz1t
u1(x1t;y1;z1t) s:t: x1t + w1z1t ￿ w1 ￿ c (14)
Thus his gain from reneging would take the form of consuming the household
good without fully paying for it what was agreed, and thereby enjoying more
consumption of the market good and leisure for himself.
2 could refuse to supply the household good to 1, thus losing the payment
b; and so achieving the utility
^ u2t = arg max
x2ty2tz2t
u2(x2t;y2t;z2t) s:t: x2t + py2t + w2z2t ￿ w2 + c (15)
Thus she could gain, for example, by using time not spent on household pro-
duction for the primary earner to work more in the market, replacing at least
to some extent the loss of consumption b:
Since reneging in period t ends the relationship,5 each will obtain only their
outside options from period t+1 on. Thus, we have the incentive compatibility
or self enforcement constraints at each t
Uit ￿ ^ uit + ￿U0
it+1 i = 1;2 (16)
We can rewrite this as
Uit+1 ￿ U0
it+1 ￿ (^ uit ￿ uit)=￿ > 0 i = 1;2 (17)
5Following MacLeod and Malcomson, we assume that reneging leads to a loss of trust that
makes it impossible to restart the relationship. This ￿nesses issues to do with renegotiation
proofness.
5implying, given ^ uit > uit that the individual rationality conditions in (13) for
any t > ￿ cannot be satis￿ed as equalities for any feasible HRC. The requirement
that both partners must ￿nd it in their interest to continue the relationship, i.e.
that the HRC is self enforcing, shrinks the set of feasible HRC￿ s relative to that
implied by the outside options alone. Summing the two inequalities gives a







(^ uit ￿ uit)=￿ > 0 (18)
Assuming that the set of self enforceable HRC￿ s is not empty, it will also in
general not be a singleton. How then does the household choose its equilib-
rium allocation? If we want to carry out a comparative statics analysis of the
household￿ s equilibrium choices it is essential to have an answer to this question,
since, as Samuelson (1956) showed, the hypothesis that the household equilib-
rium allocation is Pareto e¢ cient is not in general su¢ cient to place restrictions
on changes in its equilibrium behaviour following changes in the exogenous vari-
ables determining that equilibrium.
We therefore propose that, given the set of feasible household allocations
￿0 ￿ ￿ that can be supported by a feasible HRC, the household chooses its
equilibrium allocation by solving the problem
max
a
H(u1;u2;w1;w2) s:t: a 2 ￿0 (19)
where the household welfare function H is concave in u1;u2 for any given w1;w2

















where H1=H2 is the household￿ s marginal rate of substitution between 1 and 2￿ s
utility in the (u1;u2)-plane. The household￿ s indi⁄erence curves in this plane at
any point steepen with increases in w1 and ￿ atten with increases in w2:These
restrictions imply that an increase in individual i￿ s wage rate always increases
i￿ s relative weight in the household welfare function.6
To explore the implications of this approach in a concrete context, we ￿rst
present an example of the model constructed so far, and then apply it to the
analysis of the e⁄ect of taxation, and in particular the comparison of joint with
independent taxation, on the distribution of welfare within the household.
6This household welfare function is a generalisation of a proposal for modelling household
choices made in Samuelson (1956). It contains as special cases both the Nash bargaining
maximand and the weighted utilitarian formulation of Browning and Chiappori (1998). See
Apps and Rees (2009b) for further discussion.
63 An Example
We assume that the utility functions take the quasilinear form
ui = xi + ’i(yi;zi) (21)
where ’i(:) is strictly concave and increasing. The implication of transferable
utility gives a particularly simple form for the upper boundary of the household￿ s
utility possibility set, which we derive by solving the problem
max
xiyizi
u1 = x1 + ’1(y1;z1) (22)
















wi; ui ￿ 0g (25)
To solve the household￿ s allocation problem we take the HWF
H = (￿(w1;w2)u
1￿￿




1￿￿ ￿ 2 [0;1) [ (1;1) (26)
with ￿(:) 2 (0;1): We assume that ￿1 > 0 > ￿2: The parameter ￿ is a measure
of inequality aversion. It is then easy to show that maximising this HWF over
the utility possibility set, and assuming that the self enforcement constraints























Moreover, given the assumption on the derivatives of ￿(:); we have that @￿=@w1 >
0 > @￿=@w2; implying, as we would expect, that an increase in i￿ s wage rate
improves her relative share in household consumption. We can regard (27) and
(28) as de￿ning the household sharing rule in utility terms.
The results above are useful for the subsequent discussion of taxation. First
however we analyse further the nature of the HRC in this simple model. First
note that, given that the form of the household￿ s optimisation problem is the
7same in every period, it su¢ ces to talk in terms of a stationary contract a￿ with
associated values of labour supplies l￿
i; h￿
2; which yield u￿
i as de￿ned above, and
are repeated in every period. We then have
Proposition 1: The stationary HRC yielding (u￿
1;u￿
2) in each period is self




2)=(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ b￿ ￿ ￿(u￿
1 ￿ u0
1)=(1 ￿ ￿) (30)
Proof: The IC constraints under a stationary HRC become
u￿
i ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)^ ui + ￿u0
i i = 1;2 (31)
We can show that
^ u1 ￿ u￿
1 = b (32)
^ u2 ￿ u￿
2 = py￿
1 ￿ b (33)
Substituting into the IC constraints and rearranging then gives the result. These
simple results follow from the quasilinearity of the utility functions, since the
optimal values of the yi and zi are ￿xed by the wage rates, and so reneging
essentially changes only consumption, and therefore utility by the same amount.
Reneging by 1 allows him to increase his consumption by b; reneging by 2 allows
her to increase her consumption bythe value of what she supplies to 1 minus b:
If therefore py￿
1 ￿ b she has no incentive to renege.
Corollary: The stationary HRC yielding (u￿
1;u￿
2) in each period is self en-
forcing if and only if the total relationship surplus S￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)py￿
1=￿.
Proof: Note that S￿ ￿
P
i(u￿
i ￿ ^ ui): Then if the inequality is not satis￿ed
there cannot exist a b￿ satisfying the condition in Proposition 1.
4 Taxation and the Household Income Distrib-
ution
In a recent paper7, Robert Pollak discusses the issue of joint vs individual income
taxation and its e⁄ects on the distribution of income within the household, using
as his theoretical framework models of one-shot Nash bargaining games. He
comes to the conclusion that
In the absence of human capital e⁄ects, joint taxation does not ap-
pear to disadvantage women in either divorce threat or separate
spheres bargaining. Hence, [the] claim that joint taxation disadvan-
tages women, if it is correct, depends on e⁄ects that operate through
the incentives to accumulate human capital.
7Pollak (2005). Gugl (2004) also discusses taxation in the context of a Nash bargaining
model.
8A key assumption underlying these models is that binding agreements that
support Pareto e¢ cient outcomes are possible but, as discussed in the Introduc-
tion, this does not seem to be a reasonable assumption for the household. Thus
we have proposed relational contracts as the appropriate theoretical framework.
An important di⁄erence between the two sets of models is that in the Nash bar-
gaining models, threat points fully determine the unique solution, whereas in
relational contract models, they de￿ne the boundaries of the set of self enforce-
able contracts, but not the speci￿c equilbrium choice within this set.8 Of course,
if Nash bargaining were used to characterise the equilibrium relational contract
then Pollak￿ s conclusion would continue to apply. However, we have in this
paper proposed a more general criterion for choice of the equilbrium contract,
namely that the household seeks to maximise some form of household welfare
function, which may give an interior solution that is not strictly determined by
the threat points.
Using the model presented in the previous section, we now show that Pollak￿ s
conclusion does not hold in the type of model proposed here, given a reasonable
interpretation of the stylised facts: in a progressive income tax system in which
the marginal tax rate increases with income, individual taxation will give a
higher utility level for the secondary worker than joint taxation. Since 70-80%
of secondary earners in households in North America and Europe are female,
this essentially contradicts Pollak￿ s conclusion. We now establish this formally.
Since we are interested only in the within-household and not the across-
household welfare distribution,9 we can assume a "representative household"
model. Let the wi now represent net of tax wages, given by
wi = (1 ￿ ti) ^ wi i = 1;2 (34)
where ti is the marginal tax rate faced by i and ^ wi is the gross wage. In a
joint tax system the ti are of course equal, and so we can model a move to an
individual tax system as being a di⁄erential tax reform with dt1 > 0 > dt2: For
example, this could come about from taxing primary and secondary earners￿
incomes separately but under the same piecewise linear system with increasing
marginal tax rates across brackets,10 or alternatively by moving to "gender-
based taxation", as advocated by Alesina et al (2007).
It follows from revenue neutrality of the tax reform and the tax revenue
constraint X
i
ti ^ wili = G (35)
where G is a given constant, that
dt1 = ￿￿dt2 (36)
8Assuming of course that the maximum of the HWF does not occur at a boundary point.
Consideration of this case would be interesting, but will be left for future work.
9This has been thoroughly analysed in Apps and Rees (1988), (1997), (1999) and (2007b).
10For a general analysis of these see Apps, Long and Rees (2009a).
9where11
￿ =
^ w2l2(1 + "2)








< 0 i = 1;2 (38)
We assume, as is empirically reasonable, that "i 2 (￿1;0]: Then the sign of ￿
simply re￿ ects the condition that the tax rates are not on the wrong side of
the La⁄er curve. Moreover, as a stylised fact we have j"1j < j"2j; secondary
earners have higher labour supply elasticities than primary earners. Thus it is
reasonable to make the assumption ￿ < 1: Then we have
Proposition 2: On the given assumptions, a tax reform with dt1 > 0 > dt2
certainly makes secondary earners better o⁄, but may or may not make them
better o⁄ relative to primary earners.





























We can show that X
i
dwi > 0 , ^ w2 ￿ ￿ ^ w1 > 0 (41)







Thus for both earners the ￿rst term is positive. From the earlier analysis we
know that @￿=@t1 < 0 < @￿=@t2: Thus the term in square brackets is strictly
negative, implying that other things being equal the distribution of income
within the household improves in favour of secondary earners. Thus secondary
earners are certainly better o⁄ a as result of the change, but whether they gain
more than primary earners depends on the value of ￿: Thus we have
du￿
2 ￿ du￿













The second term is positive and the ￿rst is nonegative if ￿ ￿ 1=2: Otherwise
everything depends on relative magnitudes.
This proposition follows directly from the result that in the model an in-
crease in w2 and decrease in w1 must increase 20s share of income if we hold
11For simplicity, we assume @li=@tj = 0; i 6= j: This is close to reality since the evidence
seems to show that @l1=@t2 = 0 while @l2=@t1 < 0 but is barely signi￿cant. Taking this latter
into account would only strengthen the results given below.
10total household income constant. Under joint taxation, marginal tax rates of
the two earners are equalised, whereas under progressive individual taxation,
secondary earners will tend to have lower marginal rates than primary earn-
ers. Holding total household income constant therefore, moving from joint to
individual taxation reduces the net of tax wage rates of primary earners and
increases those of secondary earners. As long as it is the net of tax wage rates
that determine the weights on individual utilities in the HWF, this must make
secondary earners better o⁄. The ￿rst terms in (39) and (40) could be thought
of as a "Ramsey e⁄ect". Total household income net of tax increases because
the tax rate is reduced on the earner with the higher labour supply elasiticity,
so that this is purely an e¢ ciency e⁄ect. The sizes of the relative gains from
this e⁄ect depend on the initial distribution of power within the household.
In any case, we see that in the type of model proposed in this paper, and in
contrast to the results that Pollak shows emerge from nash bargaining models,
joint taxation, under the given stylised facts, does disadvantage secondary earn-
ers, certainly absolutely and possibly relatively, and these are predominantly
women.
5 Conclusions
The ￿rst contribution of this paper was to apply the theory of relational con-
tracts to make precise the idea that because households are engaged in a re-
peated, if non-cooperative, game, we can rationalise Pareto e¢ cient outcomes
as being supported by self interest, given the speci￿c pattern of specialisation
and exchange which exists in the household. We characterise the household￿ s
choice of a particular solution from the resulting feasible set as being found
from the maximisation of a household welfare function, which is a generalisa-
tion of a suggestion originally made by Samuelson. This nests as special cases
the objective functions used in currently popular models of households engaged
in one-shot cooperative games. We take a speci￿c example of such a household
welfare function, characterise the determinants of the household utility distri-
bution, and then apply the model to examine the e⁄ects of a move from joint
to individual taxation on this distribution. We show that given the standard
stylised facts, secondary earners are always better o⁄ absolutely, and de￿ne the
conditions under which they will also be so relatively. This con￿rms the con-
clusions from models which concern themselves only with the across-household
welfare distribution.
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